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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly intercon-
nected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU
has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector:
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory
system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank
(ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of
the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the
way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right
circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s inter-
connected crises.
While the creation of the SSM makes for a crucial change, it is important to
understand the limits of its supervisory scope. First of all, it will not cover all EU
Member States: while participation is mandatory for the eurozone countries, the
other Member States have the option to join or not. Secondly, the SSM only
deals with bank supervision. Supervision of the rest of the financial sector (e.g.
insurance firms) remains a national competence. Finally, certain aspects of bank
supervision that are not deemed essential for financial stability (e.g. consumer
protection) remain the sole prerogative of national supervisors.
A division of labour has been established inside the SSM: the ECB is endowed
with final supervisory authority and national supervisors are to play a support-
ing role. In practice, banks deemed “significant” will be supervised directly by
the ECB. A bank’s significance is to be determined on the basis of its size, its
relative importance in the Member State in which it operates and/or its cross-
border operations. In normal circumstances, all banks that are not seen as “sig-
nificant” (i.e. the vast majority of banks) will be supervised by national super-
visors – while the ECB will still have the final supervisory say. Establishing an
effective working relation between the ECB and the national supervisors will be
challenging and, if not properly managed, risks becoming the weak link in the
Banking Union.
A Supervisory Board, mostly composed of the national supervisors, is to draft
the ECB’s supervisory decisions. Subsequent formal decisions are made by the
ECB’s ultimate decision-making body: the Governing Council. Under the Euro-
pean Treaties, non-eurozone countries do not have the right to vote in the ECB’s
Governing Council, and in return are not bound by its decisions. As a conse-
quence, non-eurozone countries cannot become full members of the SSM, in the
sense of having the same rights and obligations as eurozone SSM members.
Nonetheless, it seems that the legislators have accommodated for non-eurozone
membership of the SSM as much as was legally feasible. In fact, participation in
the SSM even risks being overly noncommittal for non-eurozone countries.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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A strict administrative separation between the ECB’s supervisory and monetary
tasks has been foreseen to protect the ECB’s reputation with regard to monetary
policy. However, the monetary and supervisory decision-making processes are
only partially separated. As a consequence, no genuine “Chinese Wall” has been
raised between these two tasks: policy concerns in one field will unavoidably
have an influence on the ECB’s other tasks. This should not be seen as strictly
negative. Monetary and supervisory policies need to take each other into
account, which calls for some coordination between the two. The main risk for
the ECB is therefore not the possible entanglement of supervisory and monetary
responsibilities, but the potential reputational damage when inevitable supervi-
sory mistakes occur. This risk is unavoidable – in spite of any attempt to separate
responsibilities.
In contrast to the limited accountability for its monetary responsibilities, the
ECB will have to explain and defend its supervisory policy choices in the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament. Such accountability will require a different
mind-set in the ECB. While this does not have to affect the ECB’s independence,
it is clear that there is a fine line between holding the institution accountable and
attempting to steer its future decisions.
Overall, the SSM’s organisational structure reveals the challenge in balancing
legal limits and political needs. The legal limits have resulted in a sub-optimal
design of the SSM. However, it does not appear warranted to proceed to a
Treaty revision solely for the sake of the SSM. If a Treaty revision would occur
in the future for other reasons, however, legislators should grasp the opportunity
to revise those Treaty provisions that impede a better design of the SSM.
The SSM will have an impact well beyond its borders, as it will modify the
practical functioning of European and international supervisors. Most impor-
tantly, the SSM has led to the redrawing of decision-making rules in the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA), the pan-EU supervisory authority. Major deci-
sions in the EBA will require a majority from both the SSM-countries and the
Member States outside the SSM. The difficulty of finding a right balance in the
EU level supervisory bodies’ decision-making reveals the potential tension
between supervisory integration in the SSM and the EU-wide single market.
The SSM is an important first pillar of a future European Banking Union that
aims to improve financial stability. Yet, the SSM in itself is not sufficient to
achieve this goal. An effective Banking Union requires several additional pillars:
(i) a strategy for current banking problems, (ii) common management of future
bank crises, (iii) a form of common deposit guarantee and (iv) far-reaching har-
monisation of banking sector rules. If these other pillars are put in place only
partially, the Banking Union will remain inherently unstable – as will the Euro-
pean financial sector. The creation of the SSM therefore constitutes a point ofASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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no return for the EU, at least if it wants to have a safe financial sector. The only
feasible option left to policymakers, because of the SSM, is the completion of an
ambitious Banking Union.
Making the SSM effective will require substantial efforts, as will agreeing on and
implementing the Banking Union’s other pillars. The envisaged roadmap
towards the Banking Union is both overly ambitious (as the deadlines will most
likely not be met) and incomplete (as the fate of a common deposit guarantee
remains unsure). Yet, Europe will have to persist if it is to reach the Banking
Union’s ultimate goal: a safe banking sector at the service of the European econ-
omy and its citizens.9
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis and its aftermath have hit Europe in its core. While the crisis
may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weak-
nesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sec-
tor have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into
account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative
evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its down-
ward spiral.
In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the
eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign
debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they
decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the
Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange,
supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means
of a “Single Supervisory Mechanism”, or SSM in the EU jargon.
In March 2013, the European Parliament and the Council informally agreed on
the design of the SSM. Once formally approved, the SSM is to become opera-
tional in mid-2014. It will group the eurozone countries, as well as some other
Member States that agree to participate. Inside the SSM, the European Central
Bank (ECB) will become the lead supervisor for the banking sector, with
national supervisors essentially in an assisting role only.
The SSM is to be a first step in the broader revision of public control on the
European banking sector. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union,
which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management
of the banking sector. To achieve this, the EU will have to take a number of vital
additional steps. Achieving a genuine Banking Union will not be easy. Yet, as
this paper argues, the creation of the SSM makes the completion of the Banking
Union indispensable.
Given the importance of the SSM as a point of no return for the Banking
Union, this paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the wider
creation of the Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the
EU decided to put in place the SSM (§ 1). Subsequently, the supervisory
responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of
labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§ 2). The internal func-
tioning of the SSM (§ 3) and its relation to the other supervisors (§ 4) are
discussed afterwards.
The paper subsequently sheds light on the other building blocks of the Banking
Union, arguing that they are essential to the success of the project (§ 5). TheASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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transition towards the Banking Union will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before
formulating a number of conclusions, this Egmont Paper therefore provides an
overview of the planned road ahead (§ 6).
Stijn VERHELST1
1. The author is Senior Research Fellow at EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations.
This Egmont Paper builds on a previous European Affairs Working Paper.11
1. THE NEED FOR A SINGLE SUPERVISORY 
MECHANISM
While there are sound long-term arguments for creating a European supervisor
(better cross-border supervision, less national biases, etc.), the creation of the
SSM is clearly linked to the ongoing crisis. The hope is that the SSM, as part of
the move towards a Banking Union, can lessen the short-term problems experi-
enced in Europe. The main aim is to break the “vicious circle” between the bank
and sovereign debt crises. Indeed, this link has been evident on several occasions
during the crisis.
On the one side, the problems in the banking sector have had severe repercus-
sions on public finances. Problems in the banking sector brought along an eco-
nomic crisis, which led to high deficits. In addition, the weakened banks bought
fewer government bonds of those countries whose solvability was put into ques-
tion (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). To make matters worse, several
governments had to use public money to prevent banks collapsing in a disor-
derly fashion. In the cases of Ireland and Spain, the government was not able to
provide the money for such interventions. These countries had to request Euro-
pean assistance as a result of the link between the crisis in their public finances
and the financial crisis.
Problems in public finances, on the other side, also had a negative impact on the
banking sector. Governments’ measures to reduce their deficits hit economic
growth, which in turn hit the already weakened profitability of banks. Further-
more, as some countries’ capacity to reimburse their debts was questioned, the
market value of such debt decreased. Banks saw the value of their financial buff-
ers diminish as a consequence. In the case of Greece, it was not only the market
value that decreased. The Greek public debt “haircut” led to heavy immediate
losses for the banks.
For the banks in countries that were perceived as potentially insolvent, an addi-
tional problem arose. As investors doubted whether these countries would be
able to rescue a bank, the perceived solvability of the banks located in their
territories deteriorated as well. This resulted in higher interest rates charged to
these banks as they borrowed to finance their functioning. This in turn caused
a vicious circle in which the solvency of the country was questioned even more,
resulting in even higher public borrowing costs and, as a consequence, higher
borrowing costs for banks.2
2. ELLIOTT, D., 2012, Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade-Offs and some Recommendations.
Brookings, Global Economy & Development, Working Paper 52; and ECB, 2012, Financial Stability
Review.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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Eurozone leaders sought to stop this self-reinforcing negative feedback loop by
more direct EU-level intervention in the banking sector. First of all, common
European supervision was to remove fears of investors and fellow Member
States that national supervisors were not being honest about the scale of the
problems in their banking sectors. Secondly, the possibility of direct European
recapitalisation of banks would improve the perceived solvency of the Member
States themselves.
There are indeed reasons to believe that European supervision will be of higher
quality than supervision on the national level. National supervision was simply
increasingly out of line with the reality of a transnational industry.3 Yet, it is not
a certainty that having a European supervisor by itself will lead to better super-
vision. The European supervisor will face its own set of challenges.4 Therefore,
beyond the level at which it is carried out, the quality of supervision is pivotal.
For this reason, the design of the SSM is of essential importance.
3. BONNEAU, T., 2012, Mécanisme de surveillance unique et Union bancaire. In: La Semaine juridique
entreprise et affaires, v. 86, n. 43.
4. ALLEN, F., CARLETTI, E. & GIMBER, A., 2012, The Financial Implications of a Banking Union. In:
BECK, T. (ed.), Banking Union for Europe: Risks and Challenges. Centre for Economic and Policy
Research.13
2. THE SSM’S SUPERVISORY COMPETENCES
Supervision of the financial sector has traditionally been a national competence,
with only limited cross-border cooperation taking place.5 The SSM will change
this approach by lifting a major part of supervisory responsibilities to the Euro-
pean level. These responsibilities will be given to the ECB, which will at once
become the most important financial supervisor in Europe.
However, the SSM will not lift all financial supervisory tasks to the European
level. It is therefore important to understand which elements of financial sector
supervision fall outside the scope of the SSM (2.1). Furthermore, inside the SSM
there will be a division of labour between the national and the European level,
leaving a substantial part of the supervisory tasks at the national level –
although the European level will exert final control (2.2). Figure 1 provides an
overview of future financial supervision in the EU and the role of the SSM in this
framework, as will be discussed below.
2.1. Limits to the scope of the SSM’s competences
The scope of the SSM’s supervisory competences is essentially limited in three
ways: (i) geographically, (ii) its coverage of the financial sector, and (iii) the tasks
it executes. Each of these limits is discussed below.
5. For an overview of the situation after the last reform of EU supervision, see: VERHELST, S., 2011,
Renewed Financial Supervision in Europe – Final or transitory? Egmont Paper 44.
Figure 1: The place of the SSM in the EU’s financial supervision landscapeASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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2.1.1. Only participating Member States
The SSM will not become the supervisor for the entire EU. It will encompass
only a part of the EU Member States. Its precise scope remains unclear, however,
as that depends on the willingness of Member States to join the new project.
Member States inside the eurozone simply do not have a choice. For them, mem-
bership of the SSM is obligatory. This modifies the nature of eurozone member-
ship, which now involves not only an Economic Union and a Monetary Union,
but also a Banking Union. In the past, economists had already pointed to the
fact that the financial sector was closely linked to the currency union and thus
benefited from a common approach.6
In contrast to the Member States that share the single currency, Member States
outside the eurozone are free to join the SSM. This differentiation between euro-
zone and non-eurozone countries is due to both a lack of political will in some
non-eurozone countries to join the SSM, and legal constraints that limit the
voice of non-eurozone countries in the ECB (see 3.2). It is not yet clear which
non-eurozone Member States will join the SSM. Some of them have made it
clear that they will not join the SSM – notably the UK and Sweden. Other coun-
tries have shown willingness and have an interest in joining the SSM.
Different scenarios of SSM membership are conceivable. In an inclusive sce-
nario, participation in the SSM could reach 24 or 25 Member States. In a more
selective scenario, the eurozone countries and perhaps one or two other Member
States would be part of the SSM. The latter would limit the number of partici-
pating Member States (hereinafter SSM-countries) to 20 at most. Even in such
a selective scenario, the SSM encompasses a large majority of the EU’s Member
States.
2.1.2. Only banks
As a second element limiting its scope, the SSM will not cover the financial
sector at large. It will deal with only a part of the sector, i.e. credit institutions
(and, where relevant, their parent companies). A credit institution is defined by
EU legislation as: “an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account”.7 In
this paper, the term “bank” is used for all credit institutions that meet this defi-
nition.
6. See for example: BEGG, D., DE GRAUWE, P. (et al.), 1998, The ECB: Safe at Any Speed? Monitoring
the European Central Bank. Centre for Economic and Policy Research.
7. See Art 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC. Credit institutions also include “electronic money institutions”.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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The EU definition of banks covers only part of the financial sector. It notably
does not include investment firms. Such firms are active parts of the financial
sector. Yet, as they do not receive deposits from the public they are not defined
as banks by European law. In contrast, some Member States, e.g. France, do
define investment firms as banks. For the SSM, however, only the European
definition is relevant.
Numerous other types of financial institutions also fall outside the scope of the
EU’s definition of a bank. This includes: insurance firms, hedge funds, pensions
funds, central counterparties for securities and derivatives, brokers-dealers and
asset managers. These types of financial institutions will hence continue to be
supervised at the national level.
At one point some prominent EU policymakers tried to enlarge the Banking
Union discussion a discussion on a “Financial Union”, which would encompass
a larger part of the financial sector.8 Despite these attempts the project has
remained focused on the banking sector in narrow terms. This will result in
some odd situations. The insurance arm of a financial institution will be super-
vised at the national level, while the banking arm of the same institution will be
supervised as part of the SSM. In order to function properly, this differentiation
will require close supervisory cooperation between the different supervisory lev-
els.
2.1.3. “Non-essential” supervisory tasks remain national
The SSM Regulation endows the ECB with specific supervisory competences
only (see infra). As a consequence, the national supervisors continue to carry out
all supervisory functions that are not transferred to the ECB. These tasks can be
seen as “non-essential”, in the sense of being not strictly necessary to ensure the
stability of the financial sector.
These “non-essential” tasks include, inter alia, the following9:
• Supervising banks based in countries outside the EU not having a separate
legal entity in the country, i.e. operating in the Member State by cross-border
activity or by a branch. This seems the main exception to the SSM’s compe-
tences in supervising banks. It implies that non-EU banks would be super-
8. See VAN ROMPUY, H., 2012, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. 26 June 2012; and
BARNIER, M., 2012, Towards a European financial union and a more solid European banking sector.
Speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 12 July.
9. See Recital 22 of COUNCIL OF THE EU, 2013, Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions – Final compromise text, Document No. 7776/13, 25 March (hereinafter: “March 2013 SSM
Agreement”). The Recital also mentions day-to-day supervision as a competence that should remain at
the national level. Yet, it seems that national supervisors will in some cases carry out these functions on
behalf of the ECB – the latter thus having financial supervisory authority in the matter.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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vised nationally, despite the problems they might provoke. For most citizens
it is difficult to distinguish between non-EU banks having a separate legal
entity in the country and non-EU banks that do not. As the Icelandic bank
Icesave has shown, the risks associated are far from being theoretical.10
• Verifying a bank that seeks to set up a separate legal entity (i.e. establish
itself) in the Member State. This serves to verify whether the bank meets the
relevant national legislation. Afterwards, the ECB can still decide not to give
an authorisation to a bank (see infra).
• Supervision of banks in relation to markets in financial instruments (invest-
ment services).11 The supervision of markets in financial instruments is seen
as different from the surveillance of banks’ operations as such by EU law-
makers. Thus, this competence is left at the national level.
• Macro-prudential powers. If financial stability is believed to be at risk, the
national supervisor can impose higher capital buffers on their banks. The
ECB has similar powers. The fact that both the national supervisor and the
ECB can impose capital buffers independently of each other does not neces-
sarily need to be problematic. Yet, it clouds supervisory responsibilities.
Which supervisor will/should be blamed if capital buffers are not increased
when this ought to be the case?
• Prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.
• Consumer protection.
These last two tasks can be seen as linked to financial supervision for safeguard-
ing financial stability, but not essential to it. In any case, it requires other super-
visory competences than the competences needed to monitor financial stability.
The SSM regulation therefore leaves these competences on the national level.
2.2. Supervision in the SSM
Within the limits outlined above, the ECB will become the responsible supervi-
sor for the banking sector. As mentioned, the ECB’s supervisory tasks are limited
to those expressly mentioned in the SSM Regulation – nonetheless resulting in a
vast set of tasks (2.2.1). However, the ECB will not carry out all of these super-
visory functions itself. It will only supervise those banks directly which are
deemed “significant” (2.2.2). For the banks thought to be “less significant”,
supervision will be delegated to the national supervisors – while the ECB retains
final supervisory authority (2.2.3).
10. See for example: IMF, 2012, Iceland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2008
Stand-by Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 12/91, April.
11. See MiFID, Directive 2004/39/EC; and the Commission Proposals COM(2011) 652 and COM(2011)
656.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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2.2.1. The SSM’s supervisory tasks
The European Treaties allow conferring only specific supervisory tasks onto the
ECB.12 Therefore, the SSM Regulation defines a precise list of supervisory tasks
that are to be carried out by the ECB. The list mentioned in the Regulation is
extensive and concerns the essential components of bank supervision. The ECB’s
tasks notably cover:
• Supervision of compliance with EU law, including national law that trans-
poses EU legislation. This constitutes the core of bank supervision. It notably
includes monitoring the liquidity and solvency (i.e. the financial health) of
banks.
• Carrying out “host supervision” of banks operating in the SSM, but estab-
lished in an EU Member State that does not participate in the SSM. The role
of a host supervisor is limited, and essentially concerns the supervision of
liquidity provisions.
• Supervising the governance arrangements in banks. Since the financial crisis,
corporate governance has become more important and EU law lies down
certain requirements. The requirements cover a wide range of issues, includ-
ing risk management, bonus policies and the selection of management staff.
• Supervision on a consolidated basis of (mixed) holding companies and com-
plementary supervision of financial conglomerates. When a bank is part of a
larger structure, especially one involved in other financial sectors, the ECB is
to carry out supervision at the level of that larger structure in as far as this is
relevant for bank supervision.
• Preparing for crisis situations. This includes periodic stress tests, supervision
of recovery plans (living wills) and carrying out early crisis intervention if
needed (see 5.2). By endowing the ECB with early intervention powers, the
legislators interpret the Treaty rules broadly. The Treaty Article used for the
SSM Regulation allows endowing the ECB with prudential supervisory
tasks, not crisis management. Early intervention is situated on the borderline
between supervision and crisis management. The ECB is thus not allowed to
venture much further into crisis management, at least not on the basis of the
Treaty Article used for supervision.
• Authorising banks and withdrawing bank authorisations. Banks that request
an authorisation to operate in the SSM will require the authorisation of both
the national supervisor (see supra) and the ECB. The ECB can withdraw a
bank authorisation if it finds that a bank does not respect the EU rules. With-
drawing a bank authorisation is an essential competence for a supervisor, as
it constitutes a last resort sanction rendering the supervisor credible. Revok-
ing a bank’s authorisation implies the resolution of the bank, which can be
12. Article 127(6) TFEU.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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costly. If bank resolution remains at the national level, this would result in
disputes between the ECB and the Member State. Therefore, further steps in
European crisis management and bank resolution are needed (5.2).
• Macro-prudential powers. The ECB’s macro-prudential powers are similar
to the national supervisors’ powers in the matter (see supra).
• Assessing mergers and acquisitions of banks. Beyond the traditional rules of
competition, specific assessments are performed for banks that merge or take
over other banks (e.g. their financial soundness and reputation). The ECB
will have the final say, although the national supervisor is to prepare the
initial assessment.
• Participation in supervisory colleges. Supervisory colleges are to stimulate
cross-border cooperation between supervisors. The ECB will gain a seat in
these colleges (see 4.1).
The tasks mentioned above appear to cover the key tasks of bank supervisors.13
Yet, problems may arise if the SSM-countries wish to endow the ECB with addi-
tional supervisory competences after the SSM Regulation has been adopted.
Endowing the SSM with further competences is possible only if all EU Member
States (including the non-SSM countries) agree to it. This is a cumbersome pro-
cedure, hampering the SSM’s ability to adapt to changed circumstances. Yet, it
is unavoidable in the current legal setting.14
2.2.2. “Significant” banks: direct supervision by the ECB
Determining whether or not a bank is “significant” is inherently a subjective
matter. Even so, it is of the utmost importance in the division of labour between
the ECB and the national supervisors. Only those banks that are believed to be
“significant” will be supervised directly by the ECB. The Regulation sets out 5
criteria to determine whether a bank is deemed “significant”. If a bank meets
one of the following criteria, it will be supervised directly by the ECB:
1. The value of a bank’s assets exceeds € 30 billion. This first criterion is to
ensure that the largest banks in the SSM-countries are supervised directly by
the ECB.
2. The value of a bank’s assets exceeds both € 5 billion and 20% of the GDP of
the Member State in which it is located. Due to the 20% of GDP require-
ment, this criterion only applies to SSM-countries with a GDP of less than
€ 150 billion.15 In the eurozone, these smaller SSM-countries are: Cyprus,
13. WYMEERSCH, E., 2012, The European Banking Union, a First Analysis. Ghent University, Financial
Law Institute, Working Paper 2012-07.
14. Competences would have to be transferred to the ECB using the same article on which the SSM is
based, i.e. Article 127(6)TFEU, which requires unanimity.
15. For countries with a GDP level that exceeds 150 billion, 20% of GDP exceeds € 30 billion. Banks in
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Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. The criterion would be
relevant for most non-eurozone countries that join the SSM, with the excep-
tion of the two largest non-eurozone economies, i.e. Poland and the Czech
Republic. The “at least € 5 billion” requirement excludes the smallest banks
of the smallest Member States (in the eurozone: Cyprus, Estonia and Malta),
which are believed not to be of systemic importance.16
3. A bank is among the three most significant banks in the country in which it
is located. The criterion “significant” is not defined in the Regulation. While
the value of assets and cross-border activity seem the most relevant criteria,
the precise criteria will have to be defined in more detail. This criterion does
not apply when justified by “particular circumstances”, which most likely
refers to the bank’s limited size.
4. A bank has large cross-border activities. In that case, the ECB can decide to
supervise a bank centrally. The legislators have left it to the ECB to provide
a precise methodology for this criterion.17
5. A bank receives assistance from a eurozone bailout fund. When direct finan-
cial assistance for a bank has been requested from the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) or the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), or
when a bank already receives such assistance, that bank will automatically
be put under ECB supervision. This criterion does not concern banks that
receive indirect financial assistance by the EFSF/ESM via the Member State,
as is the case for Spain and Cyprus.
These 5 criteria take into account different considerations. Criteria 1 and 4
focus on the importance of a bank on the European level, while criteria 2 and 3
refer to a bank’s relative importance to the SSM-country in which it is located.
The final criterion is to be seen in light of the European taxpayers’ money that
is at stake.
Beyond these specific criteria, the ECB can decide at any time to supervise a
specific bank directly.18 The possibility for the ECB to take charge of the super-
vision of a bank is a pivotal element in the credibility of the SSM. Without such
a provision, the ECB would not be able to exercise its final supervisory author-
ity. Yet, the ECB will have to dare to use its powers to claw back the delegation
of supervision when it has doubts regarding a national supervisor’s actions. This
will not be an easy choice as it will likely result in market unrest, but it is none-
theless essential to make the SSM function properly.
The ECB is expected to supervise only about 150 banks directly. While this is a
fraction of the more than 6.000 banks in the eurozone, these banks represent
16. When a country’s GDP exceeds € 25 billion, 20% of its GDP is by definition more than € 5 billion.
17. Article 5(4) of March 2013 SSM Agreement
18. Article 5(5) of ibid.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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approximately 80% of bank assets.19 The annex provides a tentative overview
of banks that will be supervised directly by the ECB.
A major question that remains unresolved is whether the thresholds will be peri-
odically adjusted to inflation. As it stands, this is not foreseen. As a conse-
quence, over time an increasing number of banks are likely to fall under direct
ECB supervision.
2.2.3. “Less significant” banks: national supervision on behalf 
of the ECB
Banks that do not meet one of the 5 requirements mentioned above are labelled
“less significant”. About 98% of banks in the eurozone fall under this defini-
tion. They continue to be supervised at the national level. While these banks
represent only about a fifth of the banking sector in terms of assets, it is clear
that most supervisory operations in the SSM will still be carried out nationally.20
As mentioned above, even for banks that are supervised on the national level,
the ECB still has final supervisory responsibility within the framework of the
SSM. This will require a good working relationship between the national super-
visors and the ECB. It will be challenging for the ECB to monitor national super-
visors effectively. Detailing reporting requirements is an essential part of this
task, but is not in itself sufficient. The ECB will have to determine when and to
what extent it interferes with national supervision. If not properly managed, its
decentralised functioning could prove to be the SSM’s weak spot.21
19. IMF, 2013, A Banking Union for the Euro Area.
20. Ibid.
21. BABIS, V. & FERRAN, E., 2013, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism. Working Paper, Uni-
versity of Cambridge.21
3. THE SSM’S ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
The SSM can only exercise its supervisory role adequately if the proper organi-
sational provisions are in place. A major factor is the decision-making structure
in the ECB with regard to supervisory matters, which needs to operate within
the EU’s legal limits (3.1). These legal limits also have an impact on the different
nature of the non-eurozone countries’ membership of the SSM compared to
eurozone countries’ membership (3.2). Choosing the ECB as the responsible
supervisor furthermore called for special arrangements to prevent an entangle-
ment of its supervisory and monetary tasks (3.3), and measures to ensure the
ECB’s accountability for its supervisory policy (3.4).
3.1. Supervisory decision-making in the ECB
The EU Treaties provide clear rules on decision-making in the ECB. These rules,
however, are designed with the ECB’s monetary tasks in mind. As a result, only
the eurozone countries have a say in ultimate decision-making. This, of course,
conflicted with the desire to include non-eurozone countries in the SSM. In an
effort to balance legal requirements and the need for as inclusive as possible
decision-making, a procedure had to be devised that respects the Treaty’s word-
ing while nonetheless making non-eurozone SSM-countries quasi equal partners
in decision-making.
3.1.1. The general procedure
Decision-making on supervisory matters in the SSM centres around two ECB
bodies: a) the Supervisory Board, mainly composed of national supervisors, and
b) the Governing Council, the ECB’s ultimate decision-making body.
Under the procedure that has been adopted, the Supervisory Board drafts the
ECB’s supervisory decisions. Subsequently, the decision is formally adopted by
the Governing Council. A draft decision by the Supervisory Board is deemed
adopted by the Governing Council, unless the latter objects to the draft decision
within less than ten working days.22 This procedure resembles the reversed qual-
ified majority voting that is used for a number of economic governance decisions
in the Council of Ministers.23
The Governing Council is hence the only body that can block a decision by the
Supervisory Board. Yet, it will do so only very infrequently. Under normal cir-
22. This can be less in case of particular urgency.
23. Under reversed qualified majority voting, the Commission make a proposal to the Council. That pro-
posal is subsequently deemed adopted, unless the Council objects to that decision by a qualified majority
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cumstances, this makes the Supervisory Board the de facto decision-making
body.
Besides the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council, two specific bodies
deal with supervisory decision-making in the ECB: the Mediation Panel and the
Board of Review. These two bodies only enter into play when a dispute arises
on a supervisory decision. Figure 2 provides an overview of the four decision-
making bodies. Their composition and functioning are discussed below.
3.1.2. The bodies involved in decision-making
Supervisory Board
As mentioned above, the Supervisory Board is to act as the de-facto decision-
making body. Providing the body with this role allows all SSM-countries to have
a say in the supervisory decisions made by the ECB. The voting members of the
supervisory board are:
•T h e  Chair. The Chairperson is a full-time professional, thus not exercising
other major functions on the national, European or international level. A
future Chair is first proposed by the ECB and subsequently approved by the
European Parliament and the Council.24
•T h e  Vice-chair. The Vice-chair is selected from among the members of the
ECB’s Executive Board.25 The election process is identical to that of the
Chair, although the possible candidates are – evidently – more limited.
•F o u r   ECB Representatives. These representatives are appointed by the ECB’s
Governing Council and are not allowed to perform functions linked to mon-
etary policy.
Figure 2: Supervisory decision-making in the ECB
24. In the SSM Regulation, the Council is given only a secondary role in the election process: it merely is
to adopt a decision after the approval by the Parliament. However, given that the Council may decide not
to adopt such a decision, the Parliament and the Council will in practice have to reach a consensus on any
future Chair.
25. This will most likely be the Vice-President of the ECB Executive Board, Vítor Constâncio.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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•A   representative of each SSM-country’s national supervisor. The national
supervisors constitute the bulk of the Supervisory Board’s voting members.
If the central bank is not the national supervisor, the central bank may be
present at meetings. In terms of voting, the two representatives of the same
Member State would then be “considered as one member”. The precise
meaning of the latter remains unsure. It could imply that each of the two
representatives gets half the votes allocated to the country. It could also
imply that the representatives have to vote in the same manner.
In addition to these members with voting rights, the European Commission acts
as a non-voting observer in the Supervisory Board.
A rather complex voting system in the Supervisory Board has emerged from the
legislative negotiations. In principle, decisions in the Supervisory Board are
made by a simple majority of the members. In case such voting ends in a draw,
the Chair’s vote is decisive.
ECB regulations that are adopted to apply Union law form are an exception to
this general rule. These regulations adopted by the ECB will play an important
role in streamlining supervisory practices. Such regulations are decided by qual-
ified majority voting (QMV), giving more clout to the bigger Member States. In
this case, each of the four ECB representatives will represent the median votes
of the other members. The Regulation does not provide for voting rights for the
Chair and Vice-chair in case of QMV. Until the end of 2015, however, both a
simple majority and a qualified majority are needed to adopt ECB supervisory
regulations.
Governing Council
The Governing Council’s role in supervisory decisions will most often be lim-
ited, as it can only intervene to block a decision of the Supervisory Board. In
exceptional cases, the Governing Council could make use of this possibility. This
makes the composition and voting rights of the Governing Council most rele-
vant.
The composition of the Governing Council is as follows:
• The governors of each of the national central banks of the eurozone.
• The members of the ECB Executive Board. The Executive Board is responsi-
ble for the ECB’s operational matters. It has six members (including the Pres-
ident and Vice-president of the ECB), all of whom are appointed by the euro-
zone Heads of State or Government.
Not all of the Member States and public bodies that are involved in bank super-
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non-eurozone SSM-countries are not part of the Governing Council. In addi-
tion, in SSM-countries in which bank supervision is not carried out by the cen-
tral bank, the national supervisors also do not figure among the Governing
Council’s members. Hence, these two categories do not have an automatic right
to a seat at the table in meetings of the Governing Council. Yet, the ECB’s rules
of procedure allow inviting external persons for Governing Council meetings
when this is deemed necessary.26 As a result, the exclusiveness of the Governing
Council is not to be seen in terms of presence at the meetings, but in respect of
the right to vote.
The problem of voting rights in the Governing Council stretches beyond the lack
of voting rights for non-eurozone members. As long as the eurozone does not
exceed 18 member countries, each member of the Governing Council will have
the right to vote. As each member of the Governing Council has one vote, voting
powers are until then irrespective of the economic size or population of a Mem-
ber State. Yet, when the eurozone will have more than 18 members, national
central bank governors will have to alternate their voting rights. At any given
time, only 15 central bank governors will have voting rights in the Governing
Council. Therefore, not all eurozone countries will vote in the Governing Coun-
cil. Bigger eurozone countries, in terms of GDP, will more frequently have voting
rights than their smaller counterparts, which gives them a bigger say.27
While these arrangements have been designed for the ECB’s monetary policy, the
rotational system also applies to decisions with regard to supervisory decisions.
Yet, these are not necessarily the best voting arrangements for decisions on
supervisory matters. Changing the rules would, however, be most difficult as it
would require a Treaty change.
Mediation Panel
Legislators have taken into account the possibility that difference of opinion
may arise between the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board. A specific
procedure has therefore been foreseen if the Governing Council would block a
decision that was proposed by the Supervisory Board. In that case, a national
supervisor can appeal to the Mediation Panel. The Mediation Panel is mainly
meant to solve disagreements on the impact of a decision on monetary policy.
Nonetheless, it can also be consulted in case of other types of disagreement.
26. Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (Decision ECB/2004/2).
27. See Article 10.2 of Protocol No 4 of the TFEU on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. The ECB Stat-
utes foresee a rotational system from the moment the eurozone has more than 15 members. The Statutes,
however, also provide the possibility to postpone the rule until the eurozone has more than 18 members.
This possibility was used by the ECB in 2008 (Decision ECB/2008/29). The Treaty does not allow for an
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This panel comprises a member of each SSM-country, either the governor of the
national central bank or a representative of the national supervisor. Each mem-
ber of the Mediation Panel has one vote and decisions are made by simple
majority. As all SSM-countries have a vote in the Mediation Panel, its composi-
tion is more similar to the Supervisory Board than it is to the Governing Coun-
cil. As a result, it is rather probable that the Mediation Panel would object to a
decision by the Governing Council if that decision does not correspond with the
decision originally made in the Supervisory Board.
The role of the Mediation Panel is limited, as its decisions are in no way binding
on the Governing Council. Nonetheless, a decision of the Mediation Panel is
likely to have moral authority, making it difficult for the Governing Council not
to take it into account.28
Board of Review
A Board of Review is created for the contestation of a Governing Council deci-
sion by private and legal persons, including banks. This is to allow for a timely
challenging of supervisory decisions, which are to limit the lengthy procedures
before the European Court of Justice. The Board comprises five members, who
must not be employed by the ECB or a national supervisor.
Any person to whom a supervisory decision is addressed may appeal to the
Board, as well as any person who is directly and individually affected by such a
decision. The Board subsequently casts a verdict on the matter at hand. It takes
its decision by a majority vote (i.e. at least three members approve the verdict).
After this verdict, the Supervisory Board re-examines the case. It subsequently
submits a new draft decision to the Governing Council, for which the normal
decision-making procedure applies. As for the Mediation Panel, the verdict of
the Board of Review does not commit the ECB’s decision-making bodies beyond
its moral authority.
3.2. Non-eurozone membership of the SSM
While the Treaty provides for a viable legal base for making the ECB the super-
visor for the eurozone, it has proven legally more difficult to include non-euro-
zone countries in the ECB’s supervisory scope. In a nutshell, the Treaty stipulates
that non-eurozone countries are not allowed to vote in the final decision-making
body of the ECB (see supra), nor are non-eurozone countries bound by decisions
made by the ECB.29 As a consequence, non-eurozone Member States cannot
28. Article 18(3b) of the March 2013 SSM Agreement.
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become full members of the Banking Union, in the sense of having the same
rights and obligations as eurozone countries.
Due to these limits, a specific membership has been foreseen for non-eurozone
Member States, referred to as a “close cooperation agreement” with the ECB.
Most importantly, entering into such an agreement is voluntary. If a non-euro-
zone country decides to do so, it needs to respect three important conditions
that also apply to eurozone countries: a) all its banks need to be part of the
SSM, b) the Member State needs to fully cooperate in sharing information with
the SSM, and c) the country needs to abide by ECB decisions in supervisory
matters.
Even when a non-eurozone country has entered into an agreement, the ECB is
not allowed to take a decision that directly applies to a bank of that country.
The ECB is to address its decisions to the national supervisor, who in turn needs
to ensure that the bank applies the decisions. This is a distinct difference with
banks that are based in the eurozone, which can receive direct instructions from
the ECB.
Due to both the voluntary nature of the close cooperation agreement and the
ECB’s inability to enforce supervisory decisions outside the eurozone, the close
cooperation agreement can be terminated quite easily. Such a termination would
typically be the result of a disagreement on a supervisory decision. Both the ECB
and the non-eurozone SSM-country can decide on such termination:
• Termination of the agreement by the ECB. Two options exist. Firstly, the
ECB issues a warning to a country stating that the country does not respect
one of the three conditions mentioned above (all banks involved, informa-
tion sharing, and abiding by ECB decisions). If the country does not take
sufficient action after such a warning, the ECB can end the close cooperation
agreement. A second option applies in case the Governing Council objects to
a decision by the Supervisory Board. The non-eurozone country can then
notify the Governing Council that it objects to the decision. If the Governing
Council nonetheless sticks to its decision, the non-eurozone country can
choose not to apply the supervisory decision. The Governing Council is then
to evaluate the impact of the country’s non-implementation and could decide
to suspend or terminate the close cooperation agreement.
• Termination by a non-eurozone country. Terminating the close cooperation
agreement is easier for the non-eurozone country than it is for the ECB. A
non-eurozone SSM-country can end the agreement whenever it disagrees
with a draft decision by the Supervisory Board. If a country has been part of
the SSM for more than 3 years, it can even choose to end the close coopera-
tion agreement without the need for any specific motivation. The catch,
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into a new close cooperation agreement for a period of three years.30 The
latter should deter a country from stopping the close cooperation in the spur
of the moment. Using these provisions could even delay a Member States’
entry into the eurozone, as the eurozone would surely not accept a country
to enter the Monetary Union without being part of the SSM.
The flexible close cooperation agreement was inspired by the desire to include
willing non-eurozone countries in the SSM. The final Regulation is much more
accommodating than the original Commission Proposal. It could even be asked
whether the SSM-membership for non-eurozone countries is not too flexible.
Too much flexibility can have a negative impact on the ECB’s supervisory
authority in non-eurozone countries, as these countries could at any point
threaten not to apply a supervisory decision, or leave the SSM altogether.
3.3. Separation monetary and supervisory tasks
A major concern of some Member States, notably Germany, was the risk that
endowing the ECB with supervisory responsibilities might have a negative effect
on the ECB’s monetary policy. Two arguments support this concern.
Firstly, supervisory and monetary responsibilities might conflict with each other.
For example, providing liquidity to distressed banks may stabilise the financial
system, but it can also lead to higher inflation.31 As the ECB becomes a bank
supervisor, it might take such supervisory considerations into account in its
monetary policy, to the detriment of inflation targeting. Secondly, mistakes in
bank supervision seem unavoidable, as this often requires a judgment call by the
decision-makers. Such supervisory mistakes can have a reputational impact on
the ECB in general, and thus also on its monetary policy reputation.32
To prevent supervisory decisions influencing monetary policy and vice versa,
legislators aimed to fully separate monetary and supervisory decision-making.
In the words of the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the EU should
create a “Chinese wall” between the two policies.33 This has only partly been
achieved.
30. Article 6 of the March 2013 SSM Agreement.
31. DE GREGORIO, J., 2010, Recent challenges of inflation targeting. In: Perspectives on inflation tar-
geting, financial stability and the global crisis, BIS Papers No 51.
32. The risk of reputational damage was illustrated by the problems in the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi
di Siena. As the President of the ECB Mario Draghi was Governor of the Bank of Italy when questionable
operations took place in that bank, his track record came under fire. See for example, DIXON, H., 2013,
Mario Draghi’s poisoned banking chalice. Reuters, Opinion, 4 February.
33. SCHÄUBLE, W., 2012, How to protect EU taxpayers against bank failures. Financial Times, Com-
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The SSM Regulation states that the ECB is to separate its supervisory tasks from
its monetary tasks, notably including a separation of the staff involved in the
different tasks. The separation is also reflected in decision-making, where super-
visory decisions are essentially taken by the Supervisory Board that has no role
to play in other ECB policies (see supra). The Governing Council, for its part,
has to organise separate meetings discussing either bank supervision or mone-
tary policy.
Despite these measures, there is no full separation between supervision and
monetary policies on either the national or European level. On the national,
bank supervision is carried out by the national central bank in a majority of the
Member States – i.e. the same body that deals with monetary policy.34 In
national central banks, the organisational separation between the supervision
and monetary policy is not as strict it is the case at the ECB. Requiring the
national central banks of SSM-countries to introduce such separation could be
considered.
Even on the level of the ECB, there is no full separation in decision-making. First
of all, decisions are elaborated in the Supervisory Council, which is mainly com-
posed of national supervisors. As there is a less strict separation at the national
level, this influences decision-making in the Supervisory Council as well. Fur-
thermore, the Governing Council deals with decisions concerning both bank
supervision and monetary policy. Despite the obligation to organise separate
meetings for the two policies, it is simply impossible for the members of the
Governing Council to strictly avoid concerns regarding one matter influencing
the other.
Both on the national and the European level there is hence no Chinese wall
between bank supervision and monetary policy. Under a pessimistic view, the
separation between the monetary and supervisory functions can be perceived as
just as faulty as the separation between the compartments on the Titanic.35 Yet,
it is unsure whether perfect separation is truly desirable.
Cross-cutting issues (literally in case of the Titanic, metaphorically for the SSM)
are of importance. In this respect, the main problem for the ECB’s monetary
policy during the current financial crisis is precisely the lack of detailed informa-
tion on the financial health of the banking system. Allowing for information
flows between the monetary and the supervisory arm of the ECB would largely
overcome this issue.36 Instead of aiming for a full-blown separation, it thus
34. In 11 out of 17 eurozone countries, bank supervision is carried out by the central bank.
35. For a pessimistic view, see: VAUBEL, R., 2012, Economic and legal problems of European banking
supervision. Europolis.
36. BECK, T. and GROS, D., 2012, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination instead of
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seems more important to be clear on when supervisory decisions are influenced
by monetary policy concerns, or vice versa.
Furthermore, whether or not there is a full separation between the ECB’s mon-
etary and supervisory powers, the reputational risk will remain. The ECB will
at some point undoubtedly make mistakes in the supervision of the banking
sector. While a formal separation of tasks might hold back some of the reputa-
tional damage for monetary policy, it will at a certain stage be affected. The
latter is an unwanted, but unavoidable side-effect of central banks carrying out
financial supervision.
3.4. Accountability
The creation of the SSM implies a shift in the accountability of the ECB towards
national governments and European institutions. When the ECB was created,
much attention was given to its independence. This was to reassure Germany
that the ECB would be able to perform its monetary policy in a similar vein as
the German Bundesbank. As a result of the insistence on independence, the
reporting requirements and general accountability of the ECB were limited. The
ECB became one of the most independent central banks in the world.37
Supervisory decision-making is more prone to subjective elements than mone-
tary policy. Therefore, bank supervisory tasks call for a substantial degree of
accountability, which is to a certain extent in contrast to the accountability that
is needed for monetary policy. This requires a change in the ECB’s openness
about its policy decisions, as compared to former practices. While supervision
should also be carried out independently, the supervisor needs to be open on the
decisions it makes and the reasons behind those decisions.38 Accountability does
not necessarily have to result in a less independent supervisor, as long as
accountability does not mask an attempt to steer supervisory decisions. Of
course, there is a fine line between holding the ECB accountable and attempting
to steer its future decisions.39
The accountability of the ECB is to be ensured by different instruments. A some-
what indirect form of accountability consists of an annual report by the ECB on
its supervisory operations. Beyond the annual report, a more direct form of
accountability consists of interaction between the ECB and other public bodies.
37. CHALMERS, D, DAVIES, G & MONTI, G, 2010, European Union Law. Cambridge University
Press, p. 732.
38. See principle 2 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012, Core Principles for Effective Bank-
ing Supervision.
39. QUINTYN, M., RAMIREZ, S. & TAYLOR, M., 2007, The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the
Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors. IMF Working Paper, WP/07/25.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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Such interaction mainly concerns the European level:
• The Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB is obliged to appear at least
annually in the European Parliament and the Council40. These institutions
can also request an ad hoc hearing of the Chair when this is felt to be neces-
sary;
• The Chair of the Supervisory Board can be required to have a private discus-
sion with the Chair and Vice-chairs of the European Parliament’s ECON
Committee;
• The ECB is to reply to oral and written questions from the Parliament and
the SSM-countries.
To a lesser extent, the ECB is also accountable to national parliaments:
• National parliaments can ask the ECB to appear in their parliament, but only
concerning a bank based in that Member State. In contrast to the EU-level
accountability arrangements, the ECB is not obliged to accept the invitation.
• National parliaments can ask the ECB oral and written questions. The ECB
is, however, not obliged to respond. Yet, it would be politically difficult for
the ECB not to do so.
Besides accountability of the ECB to national parliaments, Member States can
still provide for their own accountability arrangements with their national
supervisors. Yet, as these national supervisors do not have final supervisory
responsibility in SSM supervision, such accountability will become less relevant.
The fact that accountability arrangements of the SSM lie essentially at the Euro-
pean level, matches lifting bank supervision to that level. This is in line with the
December 2012 Report of the European Council President that states that
“democratic control and accountability should occur at the level at which the
decisions are taken”.41 This principle is, of course, most sensible. However,
Member States should realise that this reduces the role of their national parlia-
ments in the policies concerned. National Parliaments can still be involved in the
accountability, but this will inevitably be a more indirect form of accountability
than when bank supervision was a national competence. The issue above will
arise for other transfers of competences as well.
40. This meeting would only include the SSM-countries.
41. VAN ROMPUY, H., 2012, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. 5 December 2012.31
4. RELATION SSM WITH EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY BODIES
The creation of the SSM has repercussions beyond the borders of its participat-
ing countries. It will, first of all, modify the role of cross-border supervisory
cooperation (4.1). Furthermore, as a majority of the Member States will join the
SSM, this step in differentiated European integration is bound to have an impact
on the EU-wide bodies (4.2). The SSM can even have an influence on the func-
tioning of the international supervisors (4.3).
4.1. Cross-border supervisory colleges
About cross-border supervisory colleges
A cross-border supervisory college groups the different supervisors of the main
countries in which a given bank operates. Each supervisory college thus deals
with a specific cross-border bank. In the EU, supervisory colleges are established
for all banks with subsidiaries or significant branches in other Member States.42
Internationally, colleges are to be set up for all major cross-border financial
institutions.43 While the creation of these colleges is a step forward in cross-
border coordination, they remain non-binding. National supervisors thus do
not have to take into account the result of discussions in the supervisory col-
leges.
Impact of the SSM
The impact the creation of the SSM has on supervisory colleges depends on
whether the college deals with a bank that operates in the SSM-countries only,
or with a bank that operates beyond the borders of the SSM.
For banks operating inside the SSM only, supervisory colleges have lost much of
their added value. For matters that are considered “essential” supervisory tasks
(see 2.2.), the ECB becomes the supervisor with final authority. While there will
still be coordination among national supervisors on these matters, this will take
place inside the SSM. In case of disagreement, the ECB can enforce its decisions.
This will substantially improve cross-border coordination. For “non-essential”
supervisory tasks, the supervisory colleges remain useful (the ECB has no super-
visory authority with regard to these tasks). However, taking into account the
42. Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions [recast], OJ L 48, 30.3.2010, pp.1-252.
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limited competences that are left at the national level, it seems that the supervi-
sory colleges for SSM-banks will become much less relevant.44 It might be more
useful to coordinate the “non-essential” supervisory tasks within the framework
of the SSM-structure as well, even though the ECB would not have final author-
ity on those tasks.
For banks that operate beyond the borders of the SSM, not much should change
in principle. The ECB will gain a seat at the table of the supervisory colleges, but
this will not be to the detriment of the role played by the national SSM-supervi-
sors in the colleges. However, it is to be expected that the SSM-countries will
defend a common point of view in the supervisory colleges. Especially for those
banks that operate mostly within the SSM and in only a few other countries, this
is likely to change the dynamics in supervisory meetings. Nonetheless, as men-
tioned earlier, discussions in the supervisory colleges will remain non-binding on
the supervisors. Even if the SSM-countries should dominate a meeting, the other
supervisors remain free to adopt a different supervisory approach.
4.2. EU-level bodies
Two EU-level bodies have a substantial role to play in bank supervision. On the
one hand, the European Banking Authority (EBA) deals with supervision on the
level of individual banks (i.e. micro-prudential supervision). On the other hand,
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) deals with overall risks in the finan-
cial sector (i.e. macro-prudential supervision). Both are impacted by the creation
of the SSM, but the EBA’s operations are undoubtedly influenced the most.
4.2.1. European Banking Authority
About the EBA
The EBA was created in 2010 in the aftermath of the financial crisis and
replaced an existing committee that proved insufficiently effective in light of the
crisis.45 As the pan-EU bank supervisory body, it groups the bank supervisors of
all EU Member States.
The EBA has a variety of tasks. Some of these are limited in scope and essentially
aim to improve supervisory coordination in a non-binding manner. Yet, in other
fields, the tasks of the EBA are more substantial. The EBA has three main tasks:
44. WYMEERSCH, E., 2012, op. cit. footnote 13.
45. The EBA replaces the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), established by Commis-
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1. Working towards a single rulebook for the financial sector. This implies har-
monising rules that apply to the banks operating in the EU. The main instru-
ment for this purpose is setting technical standards that further detail EU
legislation.
2. Ensuring respect of the EU legislation. The EBA can counteract a breach of
EU law, or settle disagreements between supervisors on the application of the
European rules.
3. Prepare for and deal with crisis situations. This involves contingency plan-
ning and stress tests, as well as powers in crisis situations to impose deci-
sions46 on supervisors and banks. The EBA can also suspend certain financial
activities.
When the EBA was created, it was thought necessary to move away from the
consensus-based approach that was in place before, and which had hampered
decision-making.47 As no cross-Member State supervisory integration was fore-
seen when the EBA was created, the EBA was designed with national supervisors
in mind. Decisions in the EBA are hence taken by the supervisors of the Member
States. Before the creation of the SSM, the EBA was to take its normal decisions
by simple majority. Qualified majority applied for the EBA’s more comprehen-
sive competences (see Table 1).48
Impact of the SSM
Member States that preferred to stay outside of the SSM feared that this would
lead to them having less say in the EBA, or even no say at all. Such a fear is
based on the possibility that the SSM-countries would vote as a single entity in
the EBA. If this were the case, the SSM would indeed dominate decision-
making.
Voting as a single entity, the SSM-countries would hold a simple majority in the
EBA. They would thus be able to push through any simple majority decision.
For votes by qualified majority, the situation is more complex. Until November
2014, the eurozone as a whole will not have a qualified majority of votes, but it
would possess a blocking minority. The SSM-countries would therefore be able
to block any decision in the EBA. In November 2014, qualified majority rules
will change. As a result, the eurozone as a whole is set to have a qualified major-
ity in decision-making. A transition period will nonetheless apply until 2017,
46. Such a decision may, however, not have an impact on (“impinge’’ in the wording of the Regulation)
the financial responsibilities of the Member States.
47. Decisions by the CEBS were to be made by unanimity as much as possible. Only when a consensus
was not feasible could decisions – by way of exception – be taken by a qualified majority.
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during which a Member State can ask for the previous rules to be used.49 If
several non-eurozone countries would join the SSM, the latter would certainly
dominate the EBA if voting as a single entity.
Despite the weight of SSM-countries in the EBA, the fears of non-SSM countries
are for a large part exaggerated: neither the eurozone nor the SSM-countries will
vote as single entities in the EBA. Voting rights will still lie with the national
supervisor and the ECB will not even gain the right to vote. While the Commis-
sion’s proposal stated that the SSM-countries should coordinate their voting in
the EBA, this requirement has been dropped in the final text.
Yet, though this is not a legal obligation, it is clear that the creation of the SSM
calls for more coordination among its members with regard to some decisions
that are made in the EBA. In certain fields prior coordination and convergence
in voting seem needed. If a disagreement arises between the ECB and a non-SSM
country on supervisory practices, it seems natural that the SSM-countries would
adopt the ECB’s stance on the matter. The same goes for declaring an emergency
situation and suspending financial activities.
To accommodate for the fears of non-SSM countries, additional safeguards in
the EBA’s decision-making have therefore been provided for. The major novelty
is the double majority that is necessary for the approval of several types of deci-
sions. This double majority implies that a decision needs to be approved by both
a majority of SSM-countries and a majority of non-SSM countries. A decision
cannot be adopted if one of these majorities is lacking. The double majority will
be introduced for three types of decisions:
• Matters that were previously approved by qualified majority. Here, the dou-
ble majority comes in addition to the existing qualified majority require-
ment.
• Decisions concerning a breach of EU law and the settlement of disagreements
between supervisors. In addition to the double majority rule, a panel proce-
dure has been introduced. This panel needs to draft a preliminary decision.
The panel would be composed of the Chair of the EBA and six national
supervisors.50 The panel’s decision can subsequently be approved by a dou-
ble simple majority of Member States.
49. From November 2014 onwards, a qualified majority consists of 55% of Member States and 65% of
the EU population. See Article 16(4)TEU. All eurozone countries combined represent 60% of the Member
States and 66% of the population. As a block, they will thus acquire a qualified majority. Given the nar-
row majority, changes to the membership of the eurozone or the EU can tilt the balance in a certain direc-
tion.
50. Before, a preliminary panel was used only exceptionally, i.e. for the binding settlement of disagree-
ments with regard to consolidated supervision, which concerns the overall supervision of a banking
group.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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• Decision-making on crisis management switches from a simple majority to a
double simple majority.
The remainder of the decisions, which involves mostly low-key decisions, would
still be adopted by a simple majority. Table 1 provides an overview of the former
majority rules and the modified rules.
These voting rules allow the EBA to function normally for as long as a substan-
tial number of non-eurozone countries stay out of the SSM. However, if only a
handful of Member States would stay out of the SSM, the system would become
hardly functional. The few non-eurozone countries would gain a disproportion-
ate say in the EBA decision-making, as they would easily be able to block deci-
sions. For these reasons, the voting mechanisms in the EBA are to be revised
when four or fewer Member States are not members of the SSM.
If the non-SSM countries would block progress that is wanted by the members
of the SSM, it might bring SSM-countries to carry out some of the EBA’s func-
tions inside the SSM itself. This could notably be the case for the move towards
a single rulebook (see 5.4). In this sense the double majority requirement might
actually have a negative impact on the single market, instead of preserving it.
This risk has been acknowledged by the legislators, as the majority rules are to
be a prime element in a future review of the EBA.
Besides these precise changes to the voting rules, a general, non-binding provi-
sion is added to the EBA’s legal framework. This provision states that, in its
decision-making, “[the] EBA shall strive for consensus when taking its deci-
Table 1: Revised Decision-making in the EBA
Matter Old majority rule New majority rule
Technical standards
QMV QMV & double simple majority
Guidelines and recommendations
Financial provisions
Reconsideration of a decision to 
ban or restrict a financial activity
Breach of EU Law Simple majority
Panel proposal, adopted by 
double simple majority Settlement of disagreements
Simple majority, panel pro-
posal for the binding settle-
ment of disagreements on con-
solidated supervision*
Crisis management Simple majority Double simple majority
Other decisions Simple majority Simple majority
Notes:
Double simple majority: simple majority of both (a) countries in the SSM and (b) countries outside the
SSM.
* Panel proposal, adopted by simple majority, unless blocking minority.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
36
sions”.51 This implies a subtle, but manifest return to consensus decision-mak-
ing, despite the fact that this was seen as one of the weak points of the former
EU-level committee. It appears that Member States are again – unfortunately –
heading in that direction.
4.2.2. European Systemic Risk Board
About the ESRB
Like the EBA, the European Systemic Risk Board was created as a response to
the financial crisis. Preceding the crisis, supervisors had focused mostly on the
health of individual financial institutions. Much less attention was paid to the
overall stability of the financial system. This led to an underestimation of the
risks in the financial sector as a whole. As a response to this failure, the focus on
the overall stability (“macro-prudential supervision”) was stepped up noticeably
around the world. At EU-level, the ESRB is responsible for such supervision.
The essential task of the ESRB is to supervise the financial system in order to
detect potential risks that can affect the financial system and the real economy.
When such a risk is detected, the ESRB can emit warnings and recommendations
to the Member States and other EU bodies. The ESRB, however, lacks the com-
petence to make decisions that are binding on others, as the Member States and
EU bodies are not obliged to act upon the warnings and recommendations
issued by the ESRB.
In its present configuration, the ESRB is a rather bloated body. In an EU with
28 Member States, the ESRB has 67 members of which 38 have voting rights.
Voting members comprise representatives of all Member States, the President
and Vice-president of the ECB and other representatives of EU bodies.52 Most
decisions in the ESRB are made by simple majority. A 2/3rds majority is needed
only when a recommendation or warning is to be made public.
Impact of the SSM
In contrast to the EBA, no formal changes to the tasks or membership of the
ERSB are foreseen as part of the creation of the SSM. This is despite the fact that
the ECB will obtain major competences and expertise in the field of macro-
prudential supervision in the SSM.
51. Article 1(7a) of COUNCIL OF THE EU, 2013, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority – Final compromise text, Document No. 7775/13, 25 March.
52. The other voting members from EU bodies are: a member of the European Commission; the Chairper-
sons of the three European Supervisory Authorities; the Chair and two Vice-Chairs of the ESRB’s Advi-
sory Scientific Committee and the Chair of ESRB’s the Advisory Technical Committee.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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While this will not de jure be the case, it is possible that SSM-countries will in
practice frequently take the same stance in the ESRB, due to the ECB’s expertise.
If this is the case, the position of the SSM-countries is likely to be the determin-
ing factor in the ESRB’s decisions.53 If only eurozone members are part of the
SSM, the SSM will be just short of a simple majority – it would have 19 out of
the 38 votes. Yet, it would be able to stop any decisions being adopted. Whether
the SSM-countries will have an outright majority in the future will depend on
evolutions in EU and SSM memberships.
Despite the apparent threat of a caucus by the SSM that determines the decisions
in the ESRB, this does not seem a genuine risk. First of all, national supervisors
and the ECB will not always vote in a similar fashion. There continues to be an
element of discretionary judgement in assessing the scale of a macro-prudential
risk, which will lead to diverging voting behaviour. Secondly, the ESRB’s deci-
sions are non-binding. Even if the SSM would impose its view on the others in
the ESRB, this would not have any major consequences.
It is likely that the functioning of the ESRB will be altered as part of a review
that is to be carried out by mid-December 2013.54 This review could involve the
role of the ECB in the ESRB as well as the balance of power between the SSM
and non-SSM countries in the decision-making process.
4.3. International bodies
As was the case inside the EU, the financial crisis resulted in changes in interna-
tional bodies that deal with financial supervision. Besides the supervisory col-
leges for individual banks that were discussed above, macro-prudential supervi-
sion has gained importance.
In this respect, the FSB is of significance. The FSB is to perform macro-pruden-
tial supervision by monitoring market developments and assessing vulnerabili-
ties. It can issue warnings when needed. The FSB makes it decisions by unanim-
ity. Its extensive membership (64 members covering 21 countries and several
international bodies) complicates decision-making, rendering tough decisions
unlikely.55 Despite the creation of the SSM, no changes in FSB membership are
foreseen. This seems regrettable.
53. BABIS, V. & FERRAN, E., 2013, op. cit. footnote 21.
54. Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-pru-
dential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, OJ L 331,
15.12.2010.
55. LOMBARDI, D., 2011, The Governance of the Financial Stability Board. Brookings, Global Econ-
omy & Development, Issues Paper.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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The countries participating in the SSM should reconsider their membership in
the FSB. The ECB is already a member of the FSB. It therefore makes little sense
for the FSB to include national financial supervisors of SSM-countries, as is cur-
rently the case for France, Germany and Italy. An even more comprehensive
reform would be to let the ECB represent not only the national supervisors, but
also the national central banks of the eurozone. This would reduce the SSM
representation in the FSB by 8, creating room for the ESRB to join the FSB. Such
a move would both improve the FSB’s ability to spot financial risks in Europe
and facilitate its decision-making, rendering its supervision more effective.39
5. THE OTHER NECESSARY PILLARS OF 
THE BANKING UNION
Setting up the SSM is the first important step in the direction of a European
Banking Union. More is needed, however, for a well-functioning Banking
Union. Besides the SSM, the Banking Union is to be based on 4 other essential
pillars. These pillars are: 1) addressing short-term banking problems; 2)
arrangements for long-term crisis management; 3) a form of European deposit
insurance; and 4) harmonised rules for banks. Each of these additional pillars is
discussed in this chapter.
With the agreement on the SSM, the EU sets in motion a dynamic that will
inevitably have to lead to significant steps in these other fields of the Banking
Union. Without sufficient progress on the other pillars, the Banking Union
would be incomplete and therefore unstable. A half-finished European Banking
Union risks being worse than the existing national approach.56 The agreement
on the SSM signals a point of no return for Europe to establish a genuine Bank-
ing Union. The question thus seems not to be if the EU will put in place the
elements mentioned below, but when.57
5.1. Short-term banking problems and direct 
recapitalisation
While the SSM can help in preventing or limiting future crises, it is no solution
to the already existing problems in the banking sector. Certain instruments have
already been put in place to deal with these short-term problems, such as
national public bailouts and the ECB’s lending facilities. Yet, these instruments
seem to have hit their limits. Due to the “vicious link” between banking and
sovereign debt problems, national public support is not always the appropriate
solution. Once a country’s solvency has come into question, the promise of
potential public support loses its credibility (see 1).
In June 2012, direct European recapitalisation of banks was put forward by
European leaders as an answer to the banking woes in Spain and elsewhere.
Such direct recapitalisation was to mitigate the Spanish public fiscal problems,
as the country would not have to carry the burden of rescuing its financial sector
alone anymore. In their statement, eurozone leaders declared that the direct
recapitalisation is possible only “[w]hen an effective single supervisory mecha-
56. WYPLOSZ, C., 2012, Banking union as a crisis-management tool. In: BECK, T. (ed.), Banking Union
for Europe: Risks and Challenges. Centre for Economic and Policy Research.
57. VERHELST, S., 2012, Banking Union: Are the EMU design mistakes being repeated? Egmont, Euro-
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nism is established”.58 Although the wording allows for multiple interpreta-
tions, it seems that direct recapitalisation will be possible only when the SSM is
fully operational, i.e. in 2014. In the meantime, an operational framework for
such direct recapitalisation has to be agreed upon.
It is useful to note that direct recapitalisation is to serve as a last-resort option,
only to be used when a country risks insolvency. This is different from the com-
mon crisis management that is suggested for dealing with future crises, when a
European approach could be pursued from the moment problems arise (see
infra).
Direct recapitalisation by the EU is not without risks for the eurozone countries.
Losses due to such operations could be shouldered by all eurozone countries,
not only the country in which the bank is located. This had led the most credit-
worthy countries in the eurozone to push for three limits to direct recapitalisa-
tion.
Firstly, they seek to exclude problems that have arisen in the past.59 These prob-
lems are referred to as “legacy issues”. Such legacy issues are to some extent due
to past policies in the countries in question. Certain other eurozone countries do
not feel that they should carry the burden attached to the problems. Common
liability for legacy issues is therefore likely to be limited. Member States with
problems in their banks try to introduce a difference between, on the one hand,
“legacy issues” in a narrow sense and “retrospective loans” on the other. In their
view, “legacy issues” refer to banks that have already been closed down, while
“retrospective loans” could be used for banks that are still operating.
Beyond legacy issues, a second limit sought by the most creditworthy countries
concerns the general risk-sharing in direct recapitalisation operations. As a way
of compromise, Member State in which a bank is located will remain accounta-
ble for a more substantial part of potential losses due to direct recapitalisation
than the other countries.
Creditor countries fear that these operations could quickly deplete the ESM’s
lending capacity, requiring them to put in additional funds. Therefore, the final
limit that is set to be introduced is a limit on the amount that the ESM can spend
on direct recapitalisations. This will entail a pre-determined cap, which should
ensure that the ESM has sufficient resources to carry out its other functions.
The exact scope of these three limits will depend on the outcome of the negoti-
ations. While the limits all make sense, they also entail risks. Putting too strong
a limit on direct banks recapitalisations will hollow out their purpose. The likely
58. Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012.
59. See notably the Joint Statement issued by the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and
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consequence of limits that are too strict would be that the link between banking
and sovereign debt problems would not be broken after all. This would be most
detrimental to Ireland and Spain, where this link is preventing a recovery from
the crisis.
5.2. Future crisis management
Even with the best of bank supervisors, crises in the banking sector will occur.
Most Member States did not have a well-elaborated crisis management strategy
when the financial crisis hit Europe. The EU needs to be better prepared for
dealing with future crises. Discussions on future crisis management will basi-
cally have to answer three questions: which rules are needed, who is responsible
and who pays?
Which crisis management rules? The need for a common legal 
framework
In order to better withstand turbulence in the financial sector, crisis management
provisions have to be improved. After many deferments, the Commission finally
published a proposal on harmonised crisis management rules in June 2012, on
which an agreement is to reached between the Council and the Parliament.60
If adopted, the crisis management rules would apply to all EU Member States.
They would kick-in starting in 2018 (some Member States prefer an earlier
date).The overarching aim of the proposal is to allow banks to fail with minimal
influence on financial stability and without bailouts by public authorities. To
achieve this, three sets of crisis management tools would be introduced, each
aimed at a different stage of crisis management:
• Preparatory planning for crisis situations. Such planning is to occur in nor-
mal times, so as to be ready when problems arise. Preparatory planning
essentially centres on drawing up recovery and resolution plans for banks
(so-called living wills) and making sure the plans can be applied during a
crisis.
• Early intervention powers. Supervisors are to be able to intervene from the
moment problems are detected in a bank. Under the Commission’s proposal,
supervisors would be able to require the bank to implement its recovery plan,
60. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2012, Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recov-
ery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/
EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and
2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, COM/2012/280, 6 June.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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convene a shareholders’ meeting to decide on actions and even replace (part
of) the management of a bank.
• Bank resolution. When a bank’s problems reach a point where there is no
realistic prospect of recovery, a resolution authority would be endowed with
extensive powers. The authority would be able to break up and/or sell a bank
without the consent of its shareholders. The resolution authority would fur-
thermore be able to impose losses on the bank’s shareholders (by reducing
the value of shares) and “bail in” creditors (by reducing the value of their
claims on the bank61).
Which level is to be responsible for crisis management? The need for a 
European resolution authority
Agreeing on how crisis management should take place is not enough. It is crucial
to determine which level is to carry out these tasks. Traditionally, this has been a
national responsibility. Yet, as supervision is lifted to the European level, the same
should be done for crisis management.62 In line with the expression “you break it,
you own it”, the same level of government should both deal with bank supervision
and the consequences of failed bank supervision. If this is not the case, disagree-
ments are bound to arise during crises, which will only make matters worse.
In December 2012 European leaders committed to creating a European Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), though staying vague about what this SRM
would entail. The fact that they refrained from committing to creating a Euro-
pean Resolution Authority is not a positive sign.63 While national authorities
can be involved, it is important to create a body at the European level with final
authority on the matter – as is the case for the SSM.
Setting up a resolution authority at the European level will, however, have to
take into account the EU’s legal limits. It will notably be difficult to set up a
separate EU body, as case law limits the powers that can be delegated to an
executive EU agency.64 Nonetheless, certain legal options seem possible, nota-
bly: the enhanced cooperation procedure, Article 352 TFEU65, a new inter-
governmental agreement or endowing the Commission with crisis management
61. This can take the form of a reduction in the creditor’s claim or a conversion of the claim into equity
(e.g. shares).
62. BOFINGER, P., BUCH, C. et al., 2012, Stable Architecture for Europe – Need for Action in Germany.
German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report.
63. A draft version of the December 2012 Conclusions of the European Council made reference to the
need to create a “European Resolution Authority”. Yet, this wording was toned down to “European Res-
olution Mechanism” in the final version.
64. See the Meroni doctrine: Joined Cases 9-56 and 10-56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
65. Article 352 TFEU allows the EU to adopt measures to obtain a Treaty objective for which the Treaty
itself has not explicitly endowed the EU with the needed powers. Such measures need to be adopted by
unanimity in the Council and with the consent of the European Parliament.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
43
responsibilities.66 The German Finance Minister has indicated that he believes
these legal options to be to insecure, therefore pleading for changing the Treaty
before creating a common authority. While this would increase legal certainty,
it would also delay a full-fledged Banking Union.67
Who pays for crisis management? The need for a European backstop
Managing a bank crisis has fiscal implications. Deciding on who bears these
costs is a sensitive matter. As mentioned above, the Commission proposed rules
that allow the bank’s shareholders and creditors to bear losses when needed.
Uninsured depositors will likely also be called upon. These are useful steps in
financing crisis management, but will not always be sufficient. Other means to
find the necessary resources therefore have to be put in place.
A first element is the creation of a resolution fund that can be used to finance
crisis management. Such a fund is to be financed by contributions from the
banking sector itself. As crisis management should take place on a European
level, it is preferable to create a single fund that covers all SSM-countries, rather
than putting different national funds in place.
Even the accumulation of the instruments above (shareholders, creditors, unin-
sured depositors and a resolution fund) is not certain to provide adequate finan-
cial resources for dealing with a large-scale banking crisis. When there is a large
need for financial means to deal with a crisis, turning to public (i.e. the tax-
payer’s) resources is inevitable. Such a possible recourse to public funding is
referred to as a public backstop.
In line with the need for a European crisis manager, such a backstop should
ideally also be organised at the European level. If not, discussions on who pays
will hamper any effective use of the available resources. Furthermore, countries
individually might not always be able to bear the costs. Designing a public back-
stop on the European level will, however, not be a simple matter, as the EU does
not have the ability to levy taxes in the way that national governments do. Dif-
ferent options are available to finance crisis management at the European level,
including: a) an ex-ante agreement on burden-sharing among the SSM-coun-
tries, b) ESM-lending and c) ex-post European taxation to finance crisis man-
agement. A combination of certain of these options seems most likely. If the
ESM were to be used as a public backstop for the SSM, its relation with the non-
eurozone SSM-countries will have to be redefined.68
66. BABIS, V. & FERRAN, E., 2013, op. cit. 21.
67. SCHÄUBLE, W., 2013, Banking union must be built on firm foundations, Financial Times, Commen-
tary, 12 May.
68. IMF, 2012, A Banking Union for the Euro Area: Technical background notes. 13 February. And
PISANI-FERRY, J., SAPIR A. (et al.), 2012, What kind of European banking union? Bruegel, Policy Con-
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5.3. Deposit guarantees
Deposit guarantees serve to protect depositors. If a financial institution fails, this
guarantee is to ensure depositors that their savings can be redeemed up to a
predetermined amount. In the EU, deposit guarantees are provided by each
Member State separately – with certain common minimum requirements set at
EU level. This involves for example protection up to € 100.000.69
In July 2010, the Commission proposed to go a step further than those mini-
mum requirements by fully harmonising the rules on deposit guarantees. In
addition, it proposed the possibility for one national deposit guarantee scheme
to lend to another national scheme when needed. A single European Deposit
Guarantee Scheme, however, was not proposed.70
It is doubtful whether national level deposit guarantees can be compatible with
a European Banking Union. If a government’s financial health is put into ques-
tion, depositors will question the government’s ability to guarantee deposits.
This can lead to a “national bank run”, in which depositors move their savings
away from the banks in that country.71 National deposit guarantees thus would
not break the negative feedback loop between sovereign debt and bank crises.
The problems around the Cypriot bailout highlighted the problems of country
based deposit insurance.
For this reason, a SSM-wide form of deposit guarantees is often deemed neces-
sary, although less pressing than common crisis management.72 Yet, a European
deposit guarantee is a delicate political subject, given the fact that it can poten-
tially involve large transfers from one Member State to another. As a result of
the lack of urgency and the political resistance, no concrete official proposals on
the matter have been made.
Avoiding discussions on the matter is, however, a hazardous strategy. There is a
genuine risk that there will not be sufficient willingness to create a SSM-wide
deposit guarantee once the peak of the ongoing crisis is behind us, which would
result in a flawed Banking Union.
69. See Directive 94/19/EC [consolidated version].
70. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [Recast], 12 July
2010, COM(2010)368 final.
71. Like the evolutions of national savings that we have seen in Spain and Greece. See ELLIOTT, D.,
2012, op. cit. footnote 2.
72. CONSTÂNCIO, V., 2013, Towards the Banking Union, Speech by the Vice-President of the ECB at
the 2nd FIN-FSA Conference on EU Regulation and Supervision “Banking and Supervision under Trans-
formation” organised by the Financial Supervisory Authority, Helsinki, 12 February; and PISANI-FERRY,
J. & WOLFF, G., 2012, The Fiscal Implications of a Banking Union. Bruegel, Policy Brief 2012/02, Sep-
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5.4. Harmonised rules for banks
While the EU level already defines national rules for the financial sector to a
large extent, substantial differences persist. Such differences in national regula-
tion hamper effective supervision at the European level. More harmonised rules
therefore need to be put in place to facilitate the task of the SSM and hence
improve the quality of its supervision. In EU jargon, such harmonisation takes
the form of a single rulebook.
National policy actions after the Liikanen Report on Bank Structural Reform
illustrate the difficulties of achieving common rules. The main recommendation
of the Report was to separate investment and retail banking to a certain extent
(“ring-fencing”).73 The two biggest countries in the SSM, France and Germany,
both pursued their own, separate approach in response to these recommenda-
tions, even though the SSM requires a common approach.
A major step in the harmonisation of financial sector legislation was the agree-
ment on the Capital Requirements IV Package (CRD IV) in March 2013.74 This
package mainly translates the Basel III agreement into European law, although
it also contains rules on other matters such as bankers’ bonuses.
In other fields, regulatory convergence is needed as well. Here, the EBA has a
role to play. However, harmonised rules are more important for the SSM-coun-
tries than for the countries outside the SSM. For the EU as a whole, the single
rulebook essentially serves to improve the single market in financial services. For
the SSM, the single rulebook is needed for the stability of the banking system.
Tensions can arise between the SSM-countries and the other Member States. A
tendency could develop in the SSM to agree on rules on which the EBA was not
able to reach a (prompt) agreement. The double majority rules in the EBA actu-
ally push the SSM-countries to develop their own rules (see 4.2). Such closer
integration with regard to financial sector legislation in the SSM alone does not
unavoidably need to affect the EU single market, as long as non-SSM countries’
branches can continue to operate in the SSM and setting up subsidiaries in the
SSM does not become too cumbersome for banks in non-SSM countries. The
compatibility between the EU-wide single market and closer integration in the
SSM will certainly be put to the test, however.
73. High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, 2012, Final Report
“Liikanen Report”. October.
74. See COUNCIL OF THE EU, 2013, Press release. 3227th Council meeting, Economic and Financial
Affairs, 5 March.47
6. THE ROADMAP TOWARDS THE SSM AND 
THE BANKING UNION
Just as Rome wasn’t built in a day, it will take time to get the Banking Union up
and running. The EU is to act on several different fronts to achieve a full-fledged
Banking Union (see 5). During their December 2012 Summit, European leaders
have committed themselves to a most ambitious roadmap to advance the Bank-
ing Union. While the steps towards a Banking Union are intertwined, the nature
of the roadmap for the SSM is different from that of the other pillars of the
Banking Union. For the SSM, the essential task will be to take practical meas-
ures in order to make the project work. For the other Banking Union pillars, the
legislative framework is still far from finalised.
6.1. The SSM
While the European Parliament and the Council have reached an agreement on
the legislative framework of the SSM, a lot needs to be done to make the SSM
operational and effective. The SSM is to be fully operational 12 months after the
legislative text enters into force, thus mid-2014. Before that, the ECB needs to
build up its supervisory capabilities, recruit qualified staff and establish working
relations with the national supervisors. This will be an arduous task.75
The ECB can already start carrying out supervisory tasks before it obtains actual
final responsibilities. It will thus be able to monitor the banking sector, but can-
not intervene in the banking sector. The only exception to this rule is for a bank
that is directly recapitalised by the ESM. For these banks, the ECB would
already be able to take up supervisory responsibilities before the full entry into
force of the SSM. However, this stipulation conflicts with the planned timing for
direct recapitalisation, which is foreseen only for when the SSM is fully estab-
lished (see infra).
6.2. The other pillars of the Banking Union
Besides an agreement on the SSM, legislators are to find common ground on
several other aspects of the Banking Union. This includes agreements on the
procedure for direct bank recapitalisation for short-term crisis management,
longer-term crisis management rules and harmonised rules on deposit guaran-
tees. Initially, the goal was to reach a full agreement on these matters in the first
half of 2013.76 These ambitions had to be diluted.
75. IMF, 2012, A Banking Union for the Euro Area.
76. See the European Council Conclusions of December 2012.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
48
The revised goal is to have, by the end of June 2013, an agreement in the Council
on the rules for longer-term crisis management and deposit guarantees. Agree-
ments with the Parliament will have to follow later on. With respect to direct
recapitalisation of banks, Member States will only agree on “the essential ele-
ments” before the end of June. A full detailed agreement is to be reached later-
on, after an agreement on the legislative texts for longer-term crisis management
and deposit guarantees.77
Besides the elements discussed above, the Single Resolution Mechanism will be
a vital element in building-up the Banking Union. The Commission is to make
a proposal on a Single Resolution Mechanism in the first half of 2013. The EU
is to reach an agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism before the Euro-
pean elections of May 2014.
In addition to all the measures, the European supervisors are to progress in cre-
ating a single rulebook, which will be a continual project for the EBA. All the
elements taken together clearly provide for a very packed EU agenda.
6.3. A roadmap that is both overly ambitious and 
incomplete
The European calendar for putting in place the Banking Union is, in all likeli-
hood, too ambitious in terms of timing – even after a first postponement of the
deadlines. Past experiences have shown that reaching an agreement between the
European Parliament and the Council takes longer than foreseen. In addition,
the European and national (notably German) election calendars are likely to
interfere with the legislative work. Politicians will be less willing to compromise,
or simply lack the time due to campaigning.
Besides the currently overly ambitious calendar, a major issue has not yet been
included in the Banking Union’s planning: a European deposit guarantee. Some
form of European deposit guarantee will be needed in the long term to complete
the Banking Union. It is therefore likely (and desirable) that the next Commis-
sion will table proposals on the matter.
As the EU’s agenda is both overly ambitious and incomplete, it is to be expected
that only a partial Banking Union will be put in place at first. The mismatch
between the level of supervision and the level of crisis management can be partly
overcome by allowing for the direct European recapitalisation of banks. How-
ever, this is only a temporary solution (as direct recapitalisation is a last-resort
instrument, limited in size and only available for eurozone countries). A Single
77. French-German Contribution, 2013, La France et l’Allemagne ensemble pour renforcer l’Europe de la
Stabilité et de la croissance. 30 May.ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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Resolution Mechanism would therefore have to be put in place shortly after the
SSM becomes operational. Progress on harmonising banking sector rules will
also be of importance. While this will undoubtedly not have resulted in a single
rulebook before the SSM is operational, more harmonisation would allow for a
less perilous journey towards European level control over the banking sector. 51
CONCLUSION
By agreeing on a Single Supervisory Mechanism, the EU took one of its boldest
decisions since the financial crisis started. Overall, the SSM presents a rather
satisfactory first step towards the Banking Union. Under the right circum-
stances, the SSM has the potential to improve the quality of supervision and can
contribute to addressing Europe’s interlinked financial and sovereign debt crises.
On the positive side, the EU has agreed on a SSM that covers nearly all banks
operating in the participating countries. Policymakers thus withstood the temp-
tation of creating a partial SSM that would have covered only the largest banks.
Another positive element of the agreement is the large role that is offered to non-
eurozone countries in the SSM, within the scope of what is legally feasible. Fur-
thermore, without setbacks, the relation between the SSM-countries and the
other Member States will not pose significant problems in the near future.
The creation of the SSM, however, raises several challenges as well. Whether the
SSM will indeed prove to be a better supervisor than the previous supervisory
structures remains unsure. It will be quite a task for the ECB to take up its
supervisory role, as it needs to quickly develop supervisory competences. Fur-
thermore, practical arrangements are needed with regard to the tasks that
national bank supervisors carry out on behalf of the ECB. The ECB will have to
be able to monitor national supervisors and spot potential problems. Once oper-
ational, it will have to exert its final supervisory authority on national supervi-
sors, even though the latter often have a long tradition. Crucially, the ECB will
have to dare to take away the supervisory functions of a national supervisor
when necessary.
Non-eurozone countries’ membership of the SSM will remain delicate. In several
ways, they will not be full members of the SSM. While the concern about a lack
of voice has been taken into account, the fact remains that non-eurozone coun-
tries do not have a say in the final decision-making body. An arguably bigger
problem is the fact that the membership of non-eurozone countries remains
rather noncommittal. At any given point, such countries will be able to leave the
SSM. This could make effective ECB supervision in those countries more diffi-
cult, as the possible exit of the non-eurozone country from the SSM will always
be an option and/or threat.
Treaty provisions limit not only the role played by non-eurozone countries in
decision-making; they also implicate smaller eurozone countries, which in the
future will lose permanent voting rights in the ECB’s final decision-making body.
While such arrangements may be appropriate for monetary policy, this is not
necessarily the case for supervision.
The lack of full non-eurozone membership and the issue of voting rights are notASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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the only fields in which the Treaty has rendered the task of designing the SSM
more difficult. This is also the case for the delegation of supervisory tasks to the
ECB and the required unanimity among Member States that is needed for
approving and modifying the SSM legislation (with, in addition, little say for the
European Parliament).
The Treaty’s limitations have resulted in a sub-optimal design of the SSM.
Despite these issues, the SSM can function within the existing Treaty. It is not
worth changing the Treaty merely for the sake of the SSM. However, if, in the
future, the Treaty is changed for other reasons, EU legislators would be wise to
revise the Treaty provisions that impede a better design of the Banking Union.
Apart from it being a good or bad evolution, the SSM marks a clear additional
step in the EU’s multi-speed integration. It strengthens the differentiation
between a) the eurozone core, b) the non-eurozone tier that is willing to partic-
ipate in closer integration, and c) the outer tier of Member States that prefer to
stay out of closer integration. The main concern here is the SSM’s impact on the
single market. With proper care, the SSM can be compatible with the single
market. Nonetheless, frictions seem unavoidable. Countries outside the SSM
have gained the power to block EU-wide decisions on the harmonisation of rules
for the banking sector. If non-SSM countries use this power too often, it is to be
expected that the SSM-countries will agree on rules that only apply to them.
This will encourage cross-border banking activities in the SSM, but could make
it more cumbersome for banks from other Member States to be active inside the
SSM-countries.
Perhaps more important than the creation of the SSM itself is the fact that it
represents a point of no return towards a European Banking Union. As a conse-
quence of the SSM, the EU will have to put in place the other essential pillars of
the Banking Union, namely: (i) a common answer to short-term banking prob-
lems, (ii) long-term crisis management arrangements, (iii) some form of a Euro-
pean deposit guarantee and (iv) harmonised banking rules. These issues will
require though decisions and risk sharing. A lack of bold decisions would result
in a dysfunctional Banking Union that will not be able to achieve or maintain
financial stability. A new crisis in the banking sector would seem inevitable. The
major question is therefore not if a genuine Banking Union will be achieved, but
when.
The task of achieving a Banking Union will not be easy. However, when the
challenges and difficulties in advancing the Banking Union prove substantial,
the EU and its Member States should keep in mind the ultimate goal: a safe
banking sector that is able to contribute to the prosperity of European citizens.
The importance of this goal should convince decision-makers to push ahead and
refrain from stopping half-way. With the creation of the SSM, the first decisive
step towards the Banking Union is taken. It is up to the EU to do the rest.53
ANNEX: TENTATIVE LIST OF EUROZONE BANKS 
UNDER DIRECT ECB SUPERVISION
The list below contains 117 eurozone banks that are likely to be considered as
“significant” and, as a consequence, supervised directly by the ECB supervision.
The list does not aim to be exhaustive or fully precise. Rather, it provides a
preliminary overview of the future supervisory landscape in the SSM.78
78. Many thanks go to Esther Tonnaer for collecting and analysing the information necessary to draw-up
this list.
Bank
Size of total 
assets 
(in bn EUR)1
Reason for 
direct 
supervision2
Note
Austria
1) Erste Group 217 (A)
2) Bank Austria 205.3 (A) Subsidiary of UniCredit (Italy)
3) Raiffeisen Zentralbank Group 157.2 (A)
4) BAWAG P.S.K. 43.4 (A)
5) Hypo Group Alpe Adria 33.7 (A)
Belgium
1) Dexia 411.2 (A)
2) BNP Paribas Fortis 352.3 (A) Subsidiary of BNP Paribas 
(France)
3) KBC Group 270 (A)
4) Belfius Bank 223 (A)
5) ING Belgium 169.1* (A) Subsidiary of ING Group (the 
Netherlands)
6) AXA Bank Europe 41.8* (A)
7) Argenta 35.2* (A)
Cyprus
1) Bank of Cyprus 36.2 (A)
2) Cyprus Popular Bank / Laiki 
Bank Group
30.4 (A) Will be resolved following the 
financial assistance programme 
for Cyprus
3) Eurobank EFG Cyprus 14.1° (B) Subsidiary of Eurobank EFG 
(Greece)
4) Hellenic Bank 8.7 (B)
5) Alpha Bank Cyprus Group 6.2* (B) Subsidiary of Alpha Bank 
(Greece)
Estonia
1) Swedbank Estonia 8.8 (B) Subsidiary of Swedbank (Swe-
den)
2) SEB Pank Estonia 4.1 (C) Subsidiary of SEB Group (Swe-
den)
3) Krediidipank 0.4 (C)ASSESSING THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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Finland
1) Nordea Bank Finland 389.7 (A) Subsidiary of Nordea Bank 
(Sweden)
2) OP-Pohjola Group 99.8 (A)
3) Danske Bank Finland (for-
merly Sampo Bank)
28.3 (C) Subsidiary of Danske Bank 
(Denmark)
France
1) Crédit Agricole 1,918.8 (A)
2) BNP Paribas 1,907.3 (A)
3) Société Générale 1250.7 (A)
4) Groupe BPCE 1190.9 (A)
5) Natixis 507.7* (A)
6) CM11-CIC Group 483.4 (A)
7) Dexia Crédit Local 362.3 (A)
8) HSBC France 240.3 (A) Subsidiary of HSBC Holdings 
(United Kingdom)
9) Banque Postale 185.7* (A)
10) Crédit Immobilier de France 41.6* (A)
Greece
1) National Bank of Greece 103.1 (A)
2) Piraeus Bank Group 75.3 (A)
3) Eurobank Ergasias 71.3 (A)
4) Alpha Bank 57.1 (A)
Ireland
1) Bank of Ireland 157.8 (A)
2) Allied Irish Bank 129.9 (A)
3) Permanent TSB 43.8 (A)
4) Ulster Bank 40.9 (A) Subsidiary of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland (United Kingdom)
Italy
1) UniCredit 969.2 (A)
2) Intesa Sanpaolo 668.7 (A)
3) Monte dei Paschi di Siena 224.1 (A)
4) Banco Popolare 136 (A)
5) UBI Banca 132.1 (A)
6) Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 92.1 (A) Subsidiary of BNP Paribas 
(France)
7) Mediobanca 79.4 (A)
8) Banca Popolare dell’Emilia 
Romagna
59.6 (A)
9) Banca Popolare di Milano 53 (A)
10) Banca Carige 47.5 (A)
11) Credito Emiliano 30.6 (A)
Bank
Size of total 
assets 
(in bn EUR)1
Reason for 
direct 
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Luxembourg
1) Deutsche Bank Luxembourg 95.9* (A) Subsidiary of Deutsche Bank 
(Germany)
2) BGL BNP Paribas 52 (A) Subsidiary of BNP Paribas 
(France)
3) Société Générale Bank and 
Trust
50.7* (A) Subsidiary of Société Générale 
(France)
4) Banque et Caisse d’Épargne 
de l’État
39.7* (A)
5) CACEIS Bank Luxembourg 36.8* (A) Subsidiary of Crédit Agricole 
Group (France)
6) UniCredit Luxembourg 26* (B) Subsidiary of UniCredit (Italy)
7) Hypothekenbank Frankfurt 
International
22.7 (B) Subsidiary of Commerzbank 
(Germany)
8) Banque de Luxembourg 17.6* (B)
9) DZ PRIVATBANK 16.5* (B) Subsidiary of DZ Bank (Ger-
many)
10) Deutsche Postbank Interna-
tional
16.1* (B) Subsidiary of Deutsche Post-
bank (Germany)
11) Norddeutsche Landesbank 
Luxembourg
15.4* (B) Subsidiary of Norddeutsche 
Landesbank (Germany)
12) Eurobank Private Bank Lux-
embourg
15* (B) Subsidiary of Eurobank 
Ergasias (Greece)
13 KBL European Private Bankers 13.4 (B)
14) Société Européenne de 
Banque
12* (B) Subsidiary of Intesa Sanpaolo 
(Italy)
15) ING Luxembourg 11.6* (B) Subsidiary of ING Group (the 
Netherlands)
Germany
1) Deutsche Bank 2,185.6 (A)
2) Commerzbank 675.6 (A)
3) KfW Bankengruppe 494.8* (A)
4) DZ Bank 406.8 (A)
5) HypoVereinsbank 399.4 (A) Subsidiary of UniCredit Bank 
(Italy)
6) Landesbank Baden-Württem-
berg
372.8 (A)
7) BayernLB 300.9 (A)
8) Hypo Real Estate Holding 236.6* (A)
9) Norddeutsche Landesbank 225.2 (A)
10) Deutsche Postbank 199.1 (A)
11) Portigon (formerly WestLB) 170.8 (A)
12) Helaba Landesbank Hessen-
Thüringen
166.5 (A)
13) DekaBank Group 138.4 (A)
Bank
Size of total 
assets 
(in bn EUR)1
Reason for 
direct 
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14) HSH Nordbank 136.4 (A)
15) Landesbank Berlin Holding 125.7 (A)
16) WGZ-Bank 96.2 (A)
17 IKB Deutsche Industriebank 31.6 (A)
Malta
1) Bank of Valletta 7 (B)
2) HSBC Malta 6 (B) Subsidiary of HSBC Holdings 
(United Kingdom)
3) APS Bank Malta 0.8* (C)
The Netherlands
1) ING Group 1,248.1 (A)
2) RaboBank Group 770.9 (A)
3) ABN AMRO Group 430.4 (A)
4) Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 143.3 (A)
5) SNS Reaal (SNS Bank) 134.2 (A)
Portugal
1) Caixa Geral de Depósitos 116.9 (A)
2) Banco Comercial Português 89.7 (A)
3) Banco Espírito Santo 83.7 (A)
4) Banco Português de Investi-
mento
44.6 (A)
5) Banco Santander Totta 41.4 (A) Subsidiary of Santander Group 
(Spain)
Slovakia
1) Slovenská Sporitelna 11.3* (C) Subsidiary of Erste Group 
(Austia)
2) VUB Banka 10.8* (C) Subsidiary of Intesa Sanpaolo 
(Italy)
3) Tatra Banka 9.2* (C) Subsidiary of Raiffeisen Group 
(Austria)
Spain
1) Santander Group 1,269.6 (A)
2) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argen-
taria
637.9 (A)
3) CaixaBank 348.3 (A)
4) Bankia 301.9 (A)
5) Banco Popular Español 130.9* (A)
6) Banesto 106.2* (A)
7) Banco Sabadell Group 100.4* (A)
8) Nova Caixa Galicia Banco 70.3 (A)
9) Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa 69.4 (A)
10) Banco Mare Nostrum 68.4 (A)
11) CatalunyaCaixa 67.5* (A)
12) Bankinter 59.5* (A)
Bank
Size of total 
assets 
(in bn EUR)1
Reason for 
direct 
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Remarks
Source: Financial reporting by relevant banks and data collected by KPMG for the banks CACEIS Bank
Luxembourg, Deutsche Postbank International and Norddeutsche Landesbank Luxembourg.
(1) 2012 data, unless indicated otherwise:
*: 2011 data
°: 2010 data
(2) Reasons for direct ECB supervision:
(A) The value of a bank’s assets exceeds € 30 billion.
(B) The value of a bank’s assets exceeds both € 5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the Member State in
which it is located.
(C) A bank is among the three most significant banks in the country in which it is located.
13) Liberbank 51.5 (A)
14) Grupo Ibercaja 45.2* (A)
15) Caja España-Duero 42.4* (A)
16) Banco Unicaja 38.3* (A)
Slovenia
1) NLB Group 14.3 (B)
2) Nova KBM 5.8* (C)
3) Abanka Vipa 4.2 (C)
Bank
Size of total 
assets 
(in bn EUR)1
Reason for 
direct 
supervision2
Note